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I. INTRODUCTION

In this cluster, Alfredo Mirandd, Christopher Slobogin, and Kevin
Johnson provide a LatCrit view of thejurisprudence of criminal procedure.
Mirandd, examining recent Supreme Court decisions, argues that there is
convincing evidence that the Fourth Amendment proscription on
unreasonable searches and seizures has a "Mexican exception,"' and
wonders "whether non-resident aliens have sufficient connection to the
United States to be considered one of 'the people." 2 Slobogin, examining
the same set of cases as Mirandd, suggests that the decisions better support
the existence of an "illegal alien ' exception rather than an exception
specific to Mexicans.4 Slobogin then speculates that another-perhaps the
most likely-impetus for the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence is a
tone-deafness to the hardships of poverty.5 Finally, Kevin Johnson points
out the similarities between racial profiling in domestic law enforcement
and in immigration enforcement, and identifies the common interest that
Latinas/os and African Americans have in challenging these practices
despite the obstacles that stand in the way of a political alliance.6
Criminal procedure in the United States is a field so inextricably
intertwined with race that Charles Ogletree has described it as a branch of
American race law.7 Yet it differs markedly from antidiscrimination law,

I. Alfredo Mirandd, Is There a "Mexican Exception" to the FourthAmendment, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 365 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Christopher Slobogin, The PovertyException to the FourthAmendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391 (2003).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 392.
6. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latinalo Cooperation in
Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341 (2003).
7. Gary Peller, CriminalLaw, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2231, 2245 (1993) (citing Charles Ogletree, Lecture at the
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that body of law that most explicitly addresses issues of race and racism.
Students of the law of antidiscrimination in employment, voting, and
education are familiar with the Supreme Court's increasingly emphatic
pronouncements of the dangers of racial classification. We are told that
state racial classifications are inherently politically divisive and socially
damaging; that they create psychological trauma and lasting stigma; that
state racial classifications constitute racial discrimination in and of
themselves; and that explicitly race-based state action must always receive
the strictest judicial scrutiny.' Racialization of the law, in short, is an
extremely dangerous thing.
The authors in this cluster all agree that the American criminal justice
system is dramatically racialized.9 The statistics are shocking and yet utterly
familiar. As Johnson notes, African Americans constitute more than fifty
percent of the population of prisons and jails in the United States, despite
the fact that they constitute only twelve percent of the population;
Latinas/os make up one-third of the prison populations in California and
New York, despite the fact that they constitute only twenty-seven and
thirteen percent of the population, respectively."0 Yet, in stark contrast to

American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 1990)).
8. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993):
Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race "are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality," . . . . They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their

membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility .... "[E]ven in the
pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve
to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and
propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an
individual's worth or needs."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000) (defining 'racial
discrimination' [as] that which singles out 'identifiable classes of persons... solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics"'); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 224
(1995) (concluding the Court's precedents establish that "any person, of whatever race, has the
right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny").
9. See generallyMirand6, supra note 1; Slobogin, supra note 3; Johnson, supra note 6.
10. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 347 n.31 (citing statistics cited by Kenneth Nunn and
Margaret Montoya). As I write this Essay, a study by the Institute for Children, Youth and
Families at Michigan State University has found that Latino youths receive longer terms of
incarceration (and other harsher penalties) than White youths charged with the same offenses. See
Latino Juvenile Offenders Get Harsher Treatment, Study Finds, 32 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL. 13, 2
(2000):
For example, among youths with no prior admissions to state correctional
facilities, Latinos charged with violent offenses were more than five times as
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the Court's fears about race-consciousness in education, employment, and
voting, the Court has been reluctant to take seriously the possibility that
state action might be necessary to combat the extreme racialization of
American criminal justice.
Representative in this regard is the Court's opinion in McCleskey v.
Kemp." In that case, the Court considered Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges to Georgia's death
penalty statute.' 2 Warren McCleskey, a Black man sentenced to death for
the murder of a White police officer during the course of a robbery, sought
habeas corpus relief with the help of a sophisticated statistical study
conducted by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues. 3 The study
revealed, among other things, that persons who murdered Whites were
statistically much more likely to be sentenced to death than were persons
who murdered Blacks, and that Black murderers were more likely to be
sentenced to death than White murderers. 4 In its opinion, the Court
affirmed in no uncertain terms its commitment to eradicating racial
prejudice from the criminal justice system." Nevertheless, citing the familiar
likely as whites to be incarcerated, (as opposed to other... sanctions). Latinos
charged with property offenses were nearly [twice] as likely as whites to be

incarcerated ....

[For drug offenses, the admission rate for Latinos was 13

times the rate for white youths, [and]
double that of whites ....

...

the average term ... was more than

Id. at 2-3. Overall, incarcerated Latino youths served an average of 305 days, compared to 193
days for White youths, and Latino youths were found to be "incarcerated in adult jails and prisons
at far higher rates than white youths... rates two to three times higher in nine states, three to six
times higher in eight states, and seven to 17 times higher in four states." Id. at 3.
I1. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
12. See id.
13. Id. at 283, 286-87.
14. See id.at 286. For example, Baldus and his colleagues found that, even after taking into
account thirty-nine nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing White victims were 4.3
times more likely to receive a death sentence than were other defendants. Id. at 287. The study
also found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving Black
defendants and White victims; 15% of the cases involving Black defendants and Black victims;
and 19% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims. Id at 286-87.
15. See id. at 309-10:
Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice process,
we have engaged in "unceasing efforts" to eradicate racial prejudice from our
criminal justice system. Our efforts have been guided by our recognition that "the
inestimable privilege of trial by jury... is a vital principle, underlying the whole
administration of criminal justice." Thus, it is the jury that is a criminal
defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice."

Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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antidiscrimination principle that racial discrimination must be conscious and
deliberate to violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court rejected
McCleskey's claim because he could not prove that the prosecutors, the
jury, or the Georgia Legislature had acted, in his particular case, with a
discriminatory purpose. Although the Court accepted Baldus' statistical
findings as accurate for purposes of deciding the claim, the Court made
equally clear that these findings, although shocking, did not constitute proof
of discriminatory purpose: 7 "Because discretion is essential to the criminal
justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we
would infer that the discretion has been abused."'" The Court expanded on
this position in its Eighth Amendment discussion:
McCleskey's argument that the Constitution condemns the
discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital
sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of
discretion in our criminal justice system....
Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious. 9
In their now-classic book, Racial Formation in the United States,2"

Michael Omi and Howard Winant treat political activity as "the continuous
process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria."'" In this view,
"the state" is best understood not as a unity, but as an unruly field of

16.
17.
18.
19.
at stake:

Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 311-13. In the last section of its opinion, the Court expressed its view on what was
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. The Eighth
Amendment is not limited in application to capital punishment, but applies to all
penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced
with similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply
to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in
other minority groups, and even to gender.

Id. at 316-37 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan, in his dissent,described this
concern, ironically, as a "fear of too much justice." Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. MICHAEL OM & HOWARD WrNANT, RACIAL FORMATION INTHE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994).
21. Id at 84 (citing ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 182

(Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 197 1)).
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institutions and individual and collective entrepreneurs, pursuing various
material and ideological projects.22 Some of these projects conflict, and
some are consistent with one another; some projects gain strength over
time, while others diminish in their political support.23 At the same time,
Omi and Winant claim that in the United States, "the state is inherently
racial,"24 by which they mean that "[flar from intervening in racial conflicts,

the state is itself increasingly the preeminent site of racial conflict."25
Putting these insights together, they argue:
Every state institution is a racial institution, but not every
institution operates in the same way. In fact, the various state
institutions do not serve one coordinated racial objective; they

may work at cross-purposes. Therefore, race must be
understood as occupying varying degrees of centrality in
different state institutions and at different historical
moments. 26
The law, I will argue, plays two important roles in the Constitution and
maintenance of state-centered racial projects. First, since legal rules are
central to the organization of all state action generally, and since race itself
is such a creature of the law in the United States, legal rules are central to
the Constitution and maintenance of racial projects with which state
institutions are involved. Second, legal doctrine and ideology serve a
jurisdictional function, making it possible for state racial projects that are
very different, perhaps even opposed to one another, to coexist.
Recent criminal procedure jurisprudence-the subject of this
Cluster-provides an example ofthese two functions of the law. While one
type of racialized state project-the social welfare state-has been under
recent attack, another racialized state project-the penal state-is on the
ascendancy. Both the social welfare state and the penal state interact with
various institutions of the capitalist state, which itself is complexly
racialized. Legal rules shape the meaning of race; the meaning of race, in
turn, affects the fortunes of various state projects.
Meanwhile, legal doctrine and legal ideology make it possible for
various state projects to coexist. Opinions like that of the majority in
McCleskey v. Kemp reconcile the egalitarian ideals of the social welfare
project with the racialist practices of the penal state. The jurisprudence of

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 83.
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the Fourth Amendment similarly allows both Mirand6's "Mexican
Exception" and Slobogin's race-neutrality to find a place in the law.
II. RACE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
According to Alfredo Mirand6, "[t]he answer to the question of whether
there is a Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment is at once both
complex and at the same time remarkably simple." ' The complex answer
has to do with the reasoning the Court has offered to explain its holdings.
As Mirandd notes:
While the [Supreme Court and other] courts have consistently
held that in principle Hispanic, or Mexican, appearance is not
sufficient to justify a stop, they have also held that Hispanic
appearance is one of several factors that may, in conjunction

with other articulable facts which, as in Terry, "taken together
with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant
28
that intrusion.Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the apparent race of a
suspect alone is not enough to support a stop, but race is a permissible
factor to be considered if it is one among many other factors. For Mirandi,
however, this principle must be understood in terms of how it is actually
applied by law enforcement:
The reality of course is that there is a Mexican Exception.
Mexican appearing persons are routinely stopped with
articulable facts that are consistent with law-abiding behavior
such as driving on a highway within 100 air miles of the
border, driving a late model sedan, wearing a cap, and driving
a car that appears29 to be weighed down, or has a number of
passengers in it.
In addition, "either looking at the officers, or not looking at the officers,
may be interpreted as suspicious conduct."3 ° If these "other factors" only
justify suspicion when combined with apparent Mexican ancestry, then the
suspect's race is the controlling factor after all.
Christopher Slobogin challenges Mirandd's assertion that there is a
Mexican Exception. Carefully examining Supreme Court opinions, he

27.
28.
29.
30.

Mirandd, supra note i, at 385.
Id.
Id. at 385-86.
Id. at 386.
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argues that, with one exception,3 the cases better support an "illegal alien"
exception.32 As Slobogin points out, the Court has never limited its analysis
or holdings in such a way as to restrict its relaxed judicial review to cases
involving Mexicans.33 The mere fact that many of the case names are
Mexican does not suggest that other undocumented immigrants are immune
to prosecution, nor have any of the Justices suggested that Mexican origin
makes any difference to the analysis.
Whether Slobogin is really in disagreement with Mirandd, however, is
not clear. Mirand6's argument may not be that the Supreme Court has
created a doctrinal, "law on the books" Mexican Exception, but rather that
the Supreme Court has created the rhetorical and practical space for law
enforcement officials to create their own "law in action" Mexican
Exception. If this is so, Slobogin's analysis does not really contradict
Mirandd's. Slobogin is concerned not with what the police and the INS
actually do, but with what the Supreme Court says can be done. On this
level, he is persuasive that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
supports a much broader underlying principle than a Mexican Exception.
Yet, as Slobogin concedes, at the Mexican border, phenotypical race is
relevant, perhaps central, to the project of identifying suspected
undocumented immigrants.' Since it is the United States border with
Mexico, and not with Canada that is most politically charged and, therefore,
most intensively policed, the "illegal alien" exception and the Mexican
Exception are largely contiguous. One way, then, to think about the
seeming conflict between Mirand6 and Slobogin is to think of it as the
difference between "law on the books" and "law on the ground." Another
way is to see their conversation as reflecting the juxtaposition of two
different racialized projects of state power.
It would be surprising, indeed shocking, if there were a Mexican
Exception at the level of constitutional doctrine. Since Plessy v.

Ferguson," the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
to require that the state act in a race-neutral manner. Moreover, Plessy's
interpretation of the equality principle served as a legal foundation for the
American social welfare state, a loose set of institutions including not only
the components ofthe "social safety net" (unemployment insurance, Social

Security, AFDC), but also, in the wake of Brown v. Boardof Education,3 6

31. Slobogin concedes that United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543 (1976), seems
to support the existence of such an exception, but condemns the decision. Slobogin, supra note
3, at 399.
32. See id. at 392-99.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 398.
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 12
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

a federal administrative apparatus that manages employment, education,
public family law, collects data, and issues statistics according to strict rules
set forth by the judiciary. These rules prohibit malignant race-conscious
"state action" in an ever-widening number of arenas, while at the same time
keeping track of people by racial classification for the purpose of
administering antidiscrimination law. Even while the Court's understanding

of race-consciousness gradually broadened and its understanding of
invidious state action narrowed, the Court was able, as in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pega," to insist that its Fourteenth Amendment

jurisprudence was unified by the suspect nature of state racial
classifications.3"
Defenders ofthis racialized social welfare state have pointed out that the
ideal of equal citizenship has permitted an ever widening group of those
formerly excluded from national citizenship to claim legal, political, and
social rights.39 Leftist critics of this project have condemned the project's
focus on the individual and its failure to recognize the ways in which the
values and privileges of elites are taken as the standard for those later to be
"included." Nevertheless, the liberal project remains home base for most
lawyers concerned with racial justice. Indeed, in some ways liberal legalism
is synonymous both with "the state" (as contrasted to "the market") and
with "the rule of law" itself. Liberal legalism is also inextricably interwined
with a mode of governance that gives legal professionals, social science
professionals, and other "experts," great authority and influence in the
making of government policy. Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon argue that
this mode of governance has been focused on managing the "social" sphere:
For more than a century of "reform," which culminated in the
"welfare state" of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the liberal
rationality of government associated with laissez faire
capitalism4' and methodological individualism was generally
37. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
38. Id. at 223-24 (identifying "skepticism," "consistency," and "congruence" as the unifying
principles of equal protection jurisprudence).
39. See, e.g., KENNETh L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CoNsTiTTrrioN (1989). Karst defines the "principle of equal citizenship" thusly: "Each individual
is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and

participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized society to treat an
individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant." Id. at 3.
40. See Angela P. Harris, Beyond Equality: Power and the Possibility of Freedom in the
Republic of Choice, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2000).
41. 1 disagree with Sarat and Simon's characterization of the economy in this period as
"laissez faire capitalism." Rather, I would argue that the dominance of "the social" as the
paradigm of governance is strongly associated with the so-called economic "Golden Age," during

which growth was high and economists confident of their ability to smooth out the highs and lows
of the business cycle and to control inflation with fiscal and monetary policy. In economics during
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reordered around the social as a terrain for positive knowledge
and effective governmental intervention .... In the twentieth
century,... [t]he space of legal constructs was colonized and
occupied by "facts" generated by social scientists.
Law and government came to rely heavily on the
methodologies and constructs of the social sciences in order
to shape the exercise of governmental power in areas as
diverse as prisons, schools, and labor .... Thus, whether we
look to government policy, legal doctrine, or social science,
the residue of the era of social liberalism remains a powerful
fusion of law, social science, and government."
More recently, however, as Sarat and Simon recognize, governance by
reliance on experts on "society" has come under attack. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, a long economic boom period gave way to a steady
decline in prosperity. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, right-wing political
activists and politicians, reinventing themselves as "neoconservatives," were
using the economic crisis as an opportunity to attack government policies
and programs associated with the "left," such as affirmative action and
programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children; to reject Keynesian
economics in favor of new laissez-faire corporatist, "supply side" economic
policies; and more broadly to attack "Big Government," or the ideal of
governance through management of "the social," itself.43 Legally, the
project of dismantling the social welfare state has been associated with the
capture of the federal judiciary by neoconservatives and libertarian
sympathizers, and with the concomitant moves to restrict civil rights and
liberties, to cut taxes, and to expand corporate and property rights as they
have been traditionally understood."'
Even in the heyday of the social welfare state, however, the
government's commitment to racial egalitarianism was always sharply
limited by its relatively narrow scope. As I have discussed elsewhere,

this period, as in the other social sciences, the prestige and confidence of experts in their ability
to manage large-scale institutions and forces was at a maximum. See MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE
PATHOLOGYOFTHEU.S. ECONOMY REVISITED: THE INTRACTABLE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC
POLICY 15-17 (2002).
42. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural
Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 5-6 (2001).
43. Emblematic here is Margaret Thatcher's famous statement, "There is no society. There
are only individuals and families." Jon Margolis, Market Versus Family Values; GOP Debate Cut
to Core About Conservatism's Vision, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1996, at C7, available at 1996 WL
2655294.
44. See generally Frank Valdes, Culture, 'Kulturkampf' and Beyond: The
Antidiscrimination Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
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Plessy45 inaugurated an era in which White supremacy, though banished
from official state policy, was allowed to thrive in the realm of "custom"
and "the social"--a realm that included employment, education, industrial
production and exchange, and residential housing patterns. 46 The revolution
marked by Brown v. Board of Education47 and the antidiscrimination
statutes passed during the "Second Reconstruction" brought housing,
employment, and education into the realm of "the public," but cases such
asMilliken v. Bradley48 and Washingtonv. Davis49 thereafter indicated that
nonconscious action and "market forces" would remain shielded from the
mandate of racial equality. Moreover, the egalitarianism required by the
Fourteenth Amendment was always limited by that amendment's limitation
to citizens. Noncitizen residents of the United States, including most Asian
American immigrants before 1952 and many Mexican immigrants, remained
subject to color-conscious state policy.50
Despite their egalitarian aspirations, the institutions of the welfare state
were deeply "raced" and "gendered" from the beginning, as policymakers
took race into account in their efforts to distinguish between the deserving
and the undeserving poor.51 As welfare was increasingly marked as African

American, welfare policies grew more punitive until "welfare as we know
it" was finally abolished altogether. 2 The familial administrative state, as
Dorothy Roberts has documented, has also been racialized:"3 nonwhite
women and children are disproportionately subject to stunning levels of
neglect and brutality in the adoption and foster care system.' Gabriel Chin
has examined the ways in which administrative governance served to
enforce the federal policy of Asian exclusion in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries."

45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. See generally Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in
Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000).
47. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that racial segregation in public elementary
schools is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause).
48. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to impose
interdistrict remedies for school segregation absent an interdistrict violation or interdistrict

effects).
49. 426 U.S. 229, 238-43 (1976) (noting that violations of the Equal Protection Clause
require proof of discriminatory intent, not merely of discriminatory effect).
50. See Harris, supra note 46.
51. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE

MEANING OF LIBERTY 204 (1997).
52. Id. at 208-09.
53. See id. See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATITERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002).

54. See ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 273.
55. Gabriel 1. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 37 (2002).
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Finally, governance in the name of "the social" generally, and the social
welfare state in particular, never completely displaced older forms of
governance. Kevin Johnson's essay in this cluster explores the parallels
between the contemporary state projects of immigration enforcement and
domestic criminal law enforcement from the perspective of racial
exclusion.16These state activities can be linked to a more generalized state
project: the penal state.
Governments are responsible not only for "law" but for "order" as well;
if liberal legalism represents the "law" in this equation, then the penal
state-also sometimes referred to as the sovereign state-represents
"order." The areas controlled by the state in its role as sovereign include
domestic policing, immigration and naturalization matters, foreign policy,
including treaty making, and war making." Violence is a prominent feature
of the sovereign state: domestic law enforcement and immigration, for
example, are areas in which state officials are explicitly authorized to use
violence against lawbreakers.5" Additionally, in the sense in which "law" is
56. See generally Johnson, supra note 6.
57. Family law can be understood as a project related to the project of the sovereign state.
Like penal law, family law traditionally has provided generously for the exercise of White
supremacy. More recently, the racial norms of the liberal project have slowly begun to infiltrate
family law, in the wake of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I(1967) (holding that antimiscegenation
statutes are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). Yet, explicit racial management
has been slow to disappear. For example, in the context of the Multiethnic Placement Act, a
federal statute intended to foster transracial adoptions, Rachel Moran explains:
Although the law is designed to establish a norm of colorblindness, enforcement
officials continue to acknowledge the social and cultural relevance of race to
family formation. Race is considered in evaluating parental competency at two
levels. In the first place, the placement process can accommodate a prospective
parent's preference for a child of the same race ....
After personal preferences are ascertained, race enters the process again
when adoption agencies make objective evaluations of parental fitness. Because
culture is presumptively relevant even though race is not, federal law leaves
considerable room for same-race placements to persist out of concern that

adoptive parents are not competent to raise children from adifferent background.
By failing to define culture yet forbidding its use as a proxy for race, official
interpretations hardly clarify which parenting strategies are desirable and which
are disqualifying. Federal officials do not say whether colorblind parenting is
culturally insensitive or racially neutral. Nor do they tell adoption agencies
whether color-conscious parenting is culturally competent or racist. Far from
making a norm of colorblindness clear, current federal law leaves the mystery of
what constitutes healthy racial socialization unsolved.
RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACiAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 143

(2001).
58. The practices of military, police, and immigration officials often overlap. Domestic
police forces were developed on the model of the military, and the arm of the Immigration and
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commonly opposed to "politics," political strategy is at the forefront of the
workings of the sovereign state. The liberal legal state of rights where the
rule of law holds sway is a place of reason and argument; the sovereign
legal state is a place where might makes right, and power, rather than
reason, settles disputes.
Where the liberal state treats its citizens as lacking in bodies, the penal
state manages power through the marking and management of bodies. For
Machiavelli, sovereign power is the "register in which sexuality and political
'
purpose are thoroughly entwined."59
As feminist scholars have
demonstrated in detail, the exercise of sovereign power, whether by the
military, the police, or border officials, is thoroughly masculinist: hostile to
both women and sexual minorities as a matter of principle as well as
practice.6" Race also has long been central to the exercise of sovereign
power in the United States. American history suggests that the social
projects of creating the nation, and of creating the idea of "whiteness," have
long been intertwined.6 This is perhaps the most profound sense in which
Omi and Winant are correct that the United States is a "racial state."
As Ian Haney L6pez points out, the very first federal naturalization
statute specified that prospective citizens of the United States be "White." 6'2
The post-Civil War amendment of this statute to permit naturalization by
persons of African descent left in place the power of the national
government to exclude other nonwhite groups, a power that has been
treated as "plenary.'6 3 From this perspective, the "Mexican Exception" of
Naturalization Service (INS) concerned with enforcement is organized similarly. in fact, critics
have regularly complained about the "militarization" of both police and immigration practices,
particularly in light of the various civil "wars" that presidential administrations have declared,
first on drugs and more recently on terrorism. For one critique of the militarization of border
control, see Timothy J. Dunn, Border Militarization Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement:
Human Rights Implications, 28 SoC. JUST. 7 (2001).
59. Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, in STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND
FREEDOM INLATE MODERNITY 186 (1995).
60. See, e.g., CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, MANEUVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF

MLITARIZINo WOMEN'S LIVES 37 (2000); CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES 65-92
(1989); Sylvanna Falcon, Rape as a Weapon of War: Advancing Human Rights for Women at the
US.-Mexico Border,28 SOC. JUST. 31 (2001); Madeline Morris, By Force ofArms: Rape, War,

and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 690-91 (1996).
61. See, e.g., MATrHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP INU.S. HISTORY (1997).

62. IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE I (1996)
(citing Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103).
63. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
ConstitutionalLaw of Immigration,46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6 (1998) ("The cases that created the
plenary power doctrine. . . not only continue to be cited but, in the words of one distinguished
authority, 'said nearly everything the modem lawyer needs to know about the source and extent
of Congress's power to regulate immigration."').
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which Mirand6 speaks is only one of the most recent manifestations of the
continuing political project that historian Rogers Smith describes as
"ascriptive Americanism."
In contrast to the activities regulated by the welfare state, where race is
thought to be a difference that makes no difference, the penal state both
actively manages racial difference (in the form of people's racialized bodies)
and actively constructs it (in the form of symbolic resources). Sovereign
power is "about race" in the most obvious ways: law enforcement officials
look for racial differences among people and direct violence against them
based on what they find. As scholars have noted in exhaustive detail, United

States prisons and jails are disproportionately full of African American and
Latina/o bodies. As Mirand6 emphasizes, immigration enforcement
activities target Mexican-looking people, people who appear to be ofIndioHispanic racial ancestry.65 Kevin Johnson's essay describes the practices of
racial profiling both at the border and on the streets.'
In addition, the sovereign state actively draws on racialized meanings
and images to justify its actions. Sovereign power is a register in which the
protection of abstract national and social bodies is understood as allimportant, and to make these imaginary bodies seem real, elites appeal to
the rhetoric ofphysical bodies. Immigration law protects the integrity of the
national body; criminal law protects the integrity of the domestic body.
Both areas of law are subject politically to "moral panics" in which the
language of contagion, corruption, and impurity-rhetoric that uses bodily
metaphors of health and disease to describe the nation-become
prominent.67 In both areas of the law, the task of protecting the fantasized
purity of legal-social bodies from contagion is identified more or less
explicitly with the task of controlling (actual) racialized bodies. From the
nineteenth-century panic about the "Yellow Peril" to present-day fears
about Arab Americans, dark bodies are associated with threats to national
and social integrity.68 As Gabriel Chin has made clear, since the Chinese

64. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 36 (proposing that "ideologies of ascriptive Americanism
have always done some of the work that civic myths do more effectively than liberalism or
democratic republicanism, despite the mythical components that those traditions also possess").
65. See generally Mirandd, supra note 1.
66. See generally Johnson, supra note 6.

67. On the rhetoric of health, disease, and pollution in criminal justice policy, see, e.g,
Martha Grace Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice, 68
TuL. L. REV. 725, 751 (1994); Mona Lynch, Pedophilesand Cyber-Predatorsas Contaminating
Forces: The Language ofDisgust,Pollution,andBoundary Invasions in FederalDebates on Sex

Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 530 (2002). On the dehumanizing of
immigrants in public discourse, even by immigrant rights activists, see John S.W. Park, Race
Discourse and Proposition187, 2 MICH. J.RACE& L. 175, 176 (1996).

68. For a historical examination of both racialized and gendered moral panics in the history
of United States drug policy, see NANCY D. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN: GENDER, DRUG POLICY,
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Exclusion Cases, the Supreme Court has granted nearly plenary power to
immigration officials to protect the national body, a protection that is
permissibly race-conscious." It is not surprising, therefore, that both police
and immigration officials engage in racial profiling as a means ofprotecting
the nation from disorder."' As Mirandd points out, protection of the nation
from the "other" often means defending the Mexican border.7" Johnson
adds that police engage in an everyday, domestic version of this ethnic
cleansing when they profile African American suspects.'
The contrast between these explicitly racialized state projects and the
rhetoric of equality, in which state racial classifications are forbidden, could
not be more stark. Yet, in practice, there is much less conflict between
sovereign and liberal power than one might expect. Judges, who administer
the liberal "rule of law," typically grant extreme deference and a high
degree of discretion to state actors when those actors cite reasons of
national security and public order. McCleskey v. Kemp"' is only one
example; another might be the infamous Supreme Court decision in
Korematsu v. UnitedStates.74 Deference and discretion to the state actors
charged with the business of exercising sovereign power provides a cover
for racial and ethnic cleansing activities that would otherwise be considered
anathema in an egalitarian society.
The jurisprudence of criminal procedure is a paradigmatic example of
this co-dependent relationship between liberal rights and sovereign power.
As many legal scholars have complained, although criminal procedure is
highly constitutionalized, the Court has, especially in recent years, gone out
of its way to show deference to the customary practices of police and other
law enforcement officials. In the "salad days" of the Warren Court, the
Supreme Court showed a willingness to disrupt business as usual in the
name of protecting individuals accused of crime from police abuse, and the
Court acknowledged the strong possibility that such abuse might not be
AND SOCIAL JUsTICE 11,32 (2000).
69. See Chin, supra note 63.
70. Indeed, at least one commentator argues that domestic law enforcement officers
subjectively experience their jobs as a kind of racialized colonial adventure. See generally James
M. Doyle, "It'sthe Third WorldDown There! ": The ColonialistVocationandAmerican Criminal
Justice, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (1992).
71. Mirandd, supra note 1, at 388-89. Other times, it means defending the United States
against Asian "spies." See Miriam Kim, Discriminationin the Wen Ho Lee Case: Reinterpreting
the Intent Requirement in Constitutionaland Statutory Race DiscriminationCases, 9 ASIAN L.J.
117, 152 (2002). Recently, it came to mean protecting the United States against Arab "terrorists."
See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576-81 (2002).
72. Johnson, supra note 6, at 349-51.

73. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
74. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding the wartime internment of Japanese Americans,
despite acknowledgment that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect").
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arbitrary but rather discriminatory in character." Since that time, as
Mirandd and Slobogin note, constitutional protections for individual
persons under suspicion of criminal activity and individuals in the custody
of the criminal justice system have been steadily eroded by the emergence
of a series of ad-hoc "exceptions" to general protections.7 6 These
exceptions provide, once again, an excellent cover for the targeting of
persons according to their perceived race. In this way, McCleskey stands
for more than the intent requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and
how it applies to the criminal justice system; it stands for the complicity of
liberal and sovereign power.
At the end of his essay, Slobogin develops the intriguing idea that a
"poverty exception" underlies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."" As he
points out, "[s]everal Court decisions define expectations of privacy in a
way that makes people who are less well-off more likely to experience
warrantless, suspicionless government intrusions."" Moreover, Slobogin
continues, "[e]ven in those situations where the interior of the home is not
viewable from a public space, the homes of poor people are more likely to
' The Court grants less
receive little or no Fourth Amendment protection."79
Fourth Amendment protection to apartments, cars, and containers located
outside a dwelling than to single-family homes;' has held that public arrests
do not require a warrant, as opposed to arrests taking place in a private
space;" has ruled that "brief police-citizen encounters on the street and on
public transportation are 'consensual," '".2 and most recently, has permitted
custodial arrests even for very minor crimes.8 3 Constitutional protection, in
criminal procedure, is tied to the concept of a reasonable expectation of
"privacy;" but privacy is tied to the ability to control access to private
property.
Whereas the social welfare state and the penal state are centrally
concerned with race-making sure that it does not matter or making sure
that it does-the capitalist state is structurally indifferent to race. Indeed,
the capitalist mode of power is, at least in principle, opposed to all status
hierarchies because it obeys the single principle of economic efficiency or
wealth maximization, under which all areas of social life should be subject
to markets and within which all participants in markets are presumed equal,
75. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS INTHE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).

76. Miranda, supra note 1, at 367-68; Slobogin, supranote 3, at 391, 393.
77. Slobogin, supra note 3, at 408-12.

78. Id at 400.
79. Id. at 402.
80. Id.
81.

Id. at 403-04.

82. Id. at 405.
83. Id. at 405-06.
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even fungible, with one another. This does not mean, however, as some
have argued, that racial discrimination has been or will soon be driven out
by market forces.8 Because capitalism both generates and thrives on
inequality, and because markets are imperfect and not separate from
politics, racial inequalities are perpetuated and often magnified by the
market practices of production, exchange, and consumption, and by the
processes of market creation.85
The criminal procedure cases Slobogin discusses are in accord with
decisions in other areas of constitutional law concerning wealth and
poverty. 6 It is uncontested that government "wealth classifications" in
scrutiny. 7 Rather, as the Court reasoned
general do not receive heightened
88
in Dandridgev. Williams,

[f]or this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic
or social regulation as "overreaching" would be far too
reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth
Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws "because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
school of thought." That era long ago passed into
particular
history.89
Although the Court has mandated that government spend resources on
poor people when access to legal counsel is at stake, that mandate is
extremely narrow.9" The general rule that the Constitution does not create

84. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on ForbiddenGrounds,31 SAN DIEGO L.

REV. 1, 1 (1994) ("[T]he best set of overall social outcomes would come from a legal order that
tolerated any form of private discrimination or favoritism, whether practiced by the most vicious
and ardent white supremacist or the most dedicated proponent of diversity or affirmative action.");
James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law
Question: A Response to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 363, 399-400 (2001) (describing

Epstein's position on Title VII that rational racial discrimination should be permitted and that
irrational racial discrimination will be driven out by market forces).
85. The discussion that follows focuses on initial allocations of property rights and
systematic transfers of wealth according to political rules that link race strongly to class. However,
it has also been suggested that another mechanism for the maintenance of racial discrimination
in markets is that individuals have a preference or "taste" for discrimination because
discrimination isa means by which social groups produce status for their members. See generally
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of GroupStatus Productionand

Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). If this is true, then even successful
"reparations" programs that attempted to undo unjust transfers and creation ofwealth would soon
be stymied by continuing racial discrimination.
86. See generally Slobogin, supra note 3.

87.
88.
89.
90.

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,102 n.61 (1973).
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
See COLE, supra note 75, at 92 (describing the Court's moves to alleviate inequality as
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"positive" but only "negative" rights remains. In practice, this means that
access to constitutional rights may be conditioned on the ability to pay for
their exercise. The inability of the homeless and the poor to control access
to property not only prevents them from exercising basic constitutional
rights; but it also means that, to the extent they cannot enjoy all the rights
and privileges of liberal citizenship, they are subject to the regulation and

control of the administrative arm of the social welfare state, an apparatus
that, as Jill Elaine Hasday explains, functions "to manage the dependency
of poor people in a wage labor economy.""' Thus, the law of government
benefits, family law, and housing is bifurcated, with one set of rights for
those who have access to property through income or wealth, and another
set of rights (often couched in the legal terms of "privilege" rather than
"right") for those who do not.92 In the new era of privatization and erosion
of the welfare state, responsibility for these "dependents" has increasingly
been transferred to the penal state.93
Race, gender, and class are historically interrelated in the United States.
At the founding of the nation, certain groups of people were excluded by
law from full participation in capitalist activity: African Americans, as

slaves, constituted property and thus could not hold property or make
contracts themselves; married women, subject to the law of coverture,
could not hold property or make contracts in their own names but were
persons only indirectly, through their fathers and husbands; indigenous
Americans were considered incapable of holding full title to land under the

"more ceremonial bows than actual reforms").
91. Jill Elaine Hasday, ParenthoodDivided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
ParentalRelations,90 GEO.L.J. 299,301 (2002); see alsoNANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS:
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION

121-44 (1997) (discussing

"dependency" as a keyword of the welfare state that labels individuals as targets for bureaucratic
social control). For a philosophical exploration of the lack of freedom of the homeless in a society
based on private property, see Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39
UCLA L. REv. 295 (1991).
92. See generallyHasday,supranote91;see, e.g., Dept. ofHousingv. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125
(2002) (upholding against a due process challenge a federal statute giving local public housing
authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or
a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have
known, of the drug-related activity); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A
History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001) (describing the
ultimately failed effort by constitutional scholars to have the Court recognize welfare rights as
property).
93. In the process, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon argue, the penal state itself takes
on some of the characteristics of the bureaucratic state, although now based on principles of risk
management rather than on social services. Feeley & Simon call this "the new penology." See
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Correctionsand Its Implications,30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992).
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doctrine of discovery.94 The Plessy9s era, as we have seen, gave
constitutional sanction to the economic exploitation and to the exclusion of
African Americans, Asian Americans, and other nonwhites through
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, and the post-World
War II "suburban-industrial complex," which was developed with the
intensification ofracial segregation and hierarchy in mind.' These and other

state projects succeeded in obstructing the efforts of racialized groups to
build capital, and systematically transferred wealth from people of color to
Whites. In contemporary times, people of color continue to routinely
experience differential access to credit as well as discrimination in
employment and housing, compounding the effects of past discrimination
and exclusion. The legal and social institutions of capitalism have absorbed,
and now reproduce, and even intensify, the economic inequalities generated
by decades of White supremacy.
Here, again, the jurisdictional function of liberal legalism provides room
for possibly conflicting state projects to co-exist. The social welfare state
has attempted to implement norms of equality and, to a modest extent,
substantive social and economic rights. At the same time, capitalism
operates not to produce equality but inequality, and is indifferent to

questions of distribution. The primary way in which the anti-egalitarian
tendencies of capitalism are shielded from scrutiny through the egalitarian
lens of the welfare state is through the "public/private distinction"-first

criticized by the Legal Realists, later by Critical Legal Studies, and finally
by mainstream constitutional theorists.' Despite near-constant critique, the

94. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (describing the doctrine of
discovery).
95. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
96. On suburbanization and the role of federal policy in the making of the Black ghetto, see
MELVINL. OLIvER&THOMASM. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: ANEW PERSPECTIVE

ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 16-18 (1999). For a general discussion of racialized state policies that
blocked Blacks from creating wealth, see id. at 37-45. For a discussion of historical state and
private actions resulting in widespread racial discrimination in housing markets, see DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE

UNDERCLASS 26-59 (1993). On the importance of home ownership, subsidized for Whites but not
for Blacks, see Phyllis Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property and Race, 14
HARV. BLACKLETR L.J. 45 (1998). The post-slavery exploitation of Black labor included the
sharecropping system, id. at 57-59; race discrimination on the part of unions and successful
employer efforts to use African Americans as lower-wage "scabs," id. at 65; and the convict labor
system. The alien land laws and the Japanese internment also intentionally prevented the
development of Asian American wealth. See Gabriel J. Chin, Citizenship and Exclusion:
Wyoming's Anti-JapaneseAlien Land Law in Context, I WYo. L. REV. 497, 505 (2001).
97. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 51-54 (describing the Legal
Realist critique of laissez-faire through the recognition that "private" law was necessarily the
product of government action); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 102-09
(1987) (setting out the Critical Legal Studies critique of the public/private distinction); SUNSTEIN,
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courts continue to treat common law institutions and distributions of
power, particularly those central to capitalism, as pre-political and thus as
"not state action." As Lisa Iglesias has put it, the United States subscribes
' Keeping the economy away
to the idea of an "anti-political economy."98
from politics, of course, makes it possible to preserve the anti-egalitarian
tendencies of capitalism and shield them from critique.
From this perspective, Slobogin' s suggestion that insensitivity to class,
rather than hostility based on race, drives Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is again not so much in conflict with Mirandd's and Johnson's focus on race
as it might first appear. On the one hand, Slobogin is surely right to suggest
that "class" and "race" are not the same thing;" the state project of
protecting and fostering corporate capitalism involves different institutions
and different forms of power than the state project of preserving and
protecting the imaginary national community, or the project of managing
social welfare. The simple insistence that "it's all about race" thus fails to
consider the complexities of how White supremacy functions in different
arenas.
On the other hand, it has been my argument, following Omi and Winant,
that each of these quite distinct state projects is nevertheless racialized. "
Race and political economy are so deeply intertwined in the United States
that class and race can never be fully separated. To this extent, Mirandd and
Johnson are right to focus on White supremacy as a, if not the, master
narrative.
III. CONCLUSION
Johnson's essay takes us to the point where the rubber meets the road.
The complexities of racial formation in the contemporary United States
mean, as Johnson explains, that Latinas/os and African Americans may
experience short-term benefits from supporting the penal state's
racialization of criminal law and immigration enforcement.' Yet, the longterm interest of both groups is in challenging, rather than strengthening,
White supremacy. As Johnson puts it, "[o]nce race is let out of the
proverbial genie's bottle.., it is difficult to limit where and when it will be
considered by law enforcement authorities."'' 2 The result, as he
acknowledges, is a classic "prisoner's dilemma": each player will be far

supra, at 3-4 (adopting a critique of "status quo neutrality" in constitutional law).
98. See Lisa Iglesias, Structural Violence: Law and the Anti-Political Economy (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
99. Slobogin, supra note 3,at 400.
100. See OMI & WINANT, supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
101. Johnson, supra note 6, at 360-62.
102. Id. at 361.
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better off if it cooperates with the other, but neither can trust
the other not
0 3
benefit.
certain
more
but
smaller
a
seek
thus
and
to defect
Complicating the prisoner's dilemma is the fact that there is not one
form of racism, but many. As Robert Chang and Keith Aoki have pointed
out, "nativist" racism operates differently from color racism, and racialized
groups can and do play these differences against each other.O'° Indeed, as
Omi and Winant recognize, race itself is not a stable thing but a social
construction always in process.' 0 5 We have seen different relationships
between various state projects and racial formation. The social welfare
state has sought to enforce norms of race neutrality in the "legal" sphere
and to permit "social" management on the basis of race. The agencies of
the penal state have entrusted state officials with the power and discretion
to punish actual colored bodies in the name of an imaginary pure White
national body. The institutions of the capitalist state have permitted racial
differentials of political power to be leveraged in the creation and amassing
of wealth. Racialized groups involved in politics in and around Omi and
Winant's "racial state" face not one, but a multitude, of prisoner's
dilemmas.
Moreover, we are now also facing potential changes in the organization
of White supremacy, as the social welfare state gives way to both a newly
revitalized penal state concerned openly with racial and cultural policing,
and a newly revitalized "free market" capitalist state being exported around
the world. Traditional civil rights and civil liberties arguments are
uncertain tools in this new environment. McCleskey'" symbolizes the
deference liberal law pays to state forces that promise order and security,
even when the terms of that security seem blatantly in conflict with
egalitarian values. The survival of the public/private distinction represents
the similar deference that protects the anti-political economy.
Although the essays in this cluster were written before the events of
September 11, 2001, they are timely in their focus on the difficulties of
confronting the penal state with liberal values. Slobogin demonstrates the
difficulty in finding racism in the text of the applicable law. 107 Mirand6

103. Id.
104. Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1395, 1414 (1997) (noting that "[b]ecause of the construction of the
national community as White and Black, Asian Americans and Latina/os are discursively produced
as foreign").
105. Omi and Winant famously propose that "racial formation"-"the sociohistorical process
by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed"--consists of "a
process of historically situatedprojectsin which human bodies and social structures are represented
and organized." OMI & WINANT, supra note 20, at 55-56.
106. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
107. See generally Slobogin, supra note 3.
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reminds us of the layers of law not penetrable by courtroom arguments.'0

8

Johnson sets out both the necessity and difficulty (if not impossibility) of
building coalitions among those groups that bear the burden of American
elites' attempt to secure security for themselves.'" If these essays do not
offer us easy optimism, they at least make clear the difficulty of the path
that lies ahead.

108. See generally Mirandd, supra note 1.
109. See generally Johnson, supra note 6.
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